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Abstract 
Daily deals have emerged as an integral part of the marketing mix for retail merchants and 
have enjoyed wide acceptance by consumers. However, there is considerable ambiguity about 
the effects of deals on brand evaluation, and resulting electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM). In 
this paper, we propose that the effects of deals on eWOM are contingent on merchant 
heterogeneity and whether consumers perceive merchants' marketing efforts as desperate. We 
empirically model the effects of daily deals on eWOM for restaurants in Washington DC over 13 
months. Results show that price segment, age, and competitive deal intensity strongly moderate 
the effect of deals on resulting eWOM. We also show that deals have significant spillover effects 
on neighboring merchants who do not offer deals. We confirm these effects using three 
controlled lab experiments, where similar results are obtained without the possibility of deal 
redemption. 
 
Keywords:  Bayesian, multi-level models, laboratory experiments, consumer behavior, 
econometric analysis, competition 
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Introduction 
A recent survey found that approximately four out of ten New Yorkers have used online coupons offered 
by firms such as Groupon and LivingSocial for redemption at assorted retail outlets (YouGov 2014). IBIS 
reports that between 2009 and 2014, platforms offering such social purchasing coupons have experienced 
a growth rate of over 140%, with the majority of these deals focused on the services sector and retail 
consumer goods. Groupon, the market leader in daily deals (as these coupons are often referred to) has 
over 53 million active consumers, with over 200 million subscribers, and has sold over 400 million 
individual “deals” thus far in the United States and abroad. In the third quarter of 2014 alone, Groupon 
offered over 370,000 deals worldwide, with more than 160 million unique monthly visitors (Groupon 
2015a). Broadly, daily deal platforms such as Groupon, LivingSocial and Google Offers operate double-
sided markets, on which merchants offer deals (discounts) on one side, while individuals buy these deals, 
on the other side of the market. The platform appropriately extracts revenues from the merchant side of 
the platform, while subsidizing the consumer side of the market. 
The numbers offered above would indicate that such platforms are unqualified successes. However, 
despite their popularity, online deals have remained a controversial subject, where opinions regarding 
their value to consumers and merchants have diverged significantly. The popular press provides several 
articles detailing the failures of many merchants' online deals (Clifford and Miller 2012; Agrawal 2013, 
Cohan 2012). In a recent survey of online deals merchants, Dholakia found that only 55% of merchants 
made a profit while 26% lost money (Dholakia 2010). A LivingSocial survey finds similar results, with 
only 54% of the respondents reporting a profit (BusinessInsider 2011). Given that a restaurant servicing a 
$50 for $25 deal receives an average of $12.50, it is not surprising that some of these deals result in a loss 
for the merchant, since restaurants typically spend about 30% of their revenues on food preparation, 
more than the 25% revenues that such deals often provide (RestaurantReport 2012). However, daily deals 
can, in theory, lead to increased foot traffic, revenues and visibility for merchants at a lower customer 
acquisition cost (Dholakia 2011b).  
Daily deals, thus, represent a dilemma for the merchant. On one hand, they can be valuable for generating 
awareness, entering the consideration set of customers and boosting sales by gaining access to the 
thousands of local subscribers in the daily deals site network (Dholakia 2011C). On the other hand, 
beyond potential short-term losses from such promotions, there are also long term considerations such as 
sustainability of the increase in the number of newly acquired customers as well as the retention of 
existing customers. One of the drivers of long-term effects is the impact of deals on quality perceptions. 
Prior academic work has shown that price changes do affect reported quality perceptions amongst 
consumers (Li and Hitt 2008, McGregor et al. 2007). The direction of the effects, however, depends on 
number of factors. In some cases, consumers may respond positively to such promotional activities, while 
in other contexts where such promotions may smack of desperation, the consumer’s response is negative 
(Friestad and Wright 1994, Kirmani and Wright 1989).  
Given this dichotomy about how online deals may influence the perception of service quality offered by 
the merchant, our first research question here is: do online deals affect a merchant's reported perceived 
quality? In other words, we explore what effects the release of a daily deal has on the perceived quality of 
the merchant’s service offerings. Clearly, in the presence of competing expectations for how daily deals 
may affect the merchant’s quality perceptions, we let the empirical analysis guide us. Prior work has also 
suggested that merchant heterogeneity may influence the responses to daily deals (Kirmani and Wright 
1989). Therefore, our second research question is: what characteristics of the merchant moderate the 
effect of online deals on their perceived quality? Features such as merchant segment, age and prior 
reputation may affect the response to a daily deal – we explore these moderating factors here. 
Finally, merchants do not operate in a vacuum, but within a competitive landscape that typically includes 
other merchants and their competitive actions that then cumulatively determine the options available to 
consumers. This brings into sharp focus the effect that competitors to the focal merchant may have, 
through their own decisions regarding offering deals. Specifically, by virtue of systematically offering 
heavily discounted daily deals, competitors to the focal merchant contribute towards shaping the 
experiences and opinions of consumers, thereby driving responses to deals offered by the focal restaurant. 
Thus, business owners are facing a critical dilemma –understanding how daily deals may influence 
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consumers and ultimately their market position.  As long as these deals remain an important part of 
advertisement and, more generally, of the marketing budgets in small businesses1, understanding when 
deals may be affecting both promoted and non-promoted brand performance is critical as merchants 
attempt to increase the effectiveness of digital marketing campaigns. More formally: under what 
conditions are daily deals affecting the market position of participating and non-participating merchants? 
And perhaps more importantly, in environments where deals become the norm, how are non-
participating merchants affected?   
An important part of our analysis is on collecting data on quality perceptions of merchants. For the 
purposes of our study, we use online reviews provided by consumers on the merchants as indicators of 
perceived quality. Online reviews have often been used in the literature to gauge merchant or product 
quality. Indeed, anecdotally, 88% of the respondents to a recent survey said they do use online reviews to 
determine the quality of a business (BrightLocal 2013). Consumers routinely use online reviews to inform 
their purchasing decisions in both the online and offline contexts for a number of products and services. 
Apart from being used in informing consumer decisions, online reviews also have considerable influence 
in shaping common opinion about businesses. For example, 72% of surveyed consumers say that positive 
reviews make them trust a business or product more while 88% of consumers trust online reviews as 
much as personal recommendations (Cone 2011). 
More formally, scholars have found that online reviews have a significant effect on outcomes like sales 
and consumer choice (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Clemons et al. 2006, Duan et al. 2008, Chen and Xie 
2008, Zhu and Zhang 2010). In the specific context of restaurants, which we study, Luca (2011) found 
that a one-star increase in Yelp rating leads to a 5-9 percent increase in revenue. Thus, inasmuch as recent 
literature indicates that online reviews are an important driver of a merchant’s sales performance and also 
reflect customers’ opinions about quality, we use online reviews as our measure of perceived quality of the 
merchant offering a daily deal.  
We conduct our study using data collected from two sources. We focus on restaurants in our study, since 
there is considerable research indicating that online reviews are significantly associated promotional 
activities in this context (Lu et al. 2013). Our dataset is thus composed of daily deals offered by 
restaurants within a major metropolitan area in the United States over a 13-month period. We collect data 
on daily deals offered by multiple platforms and their performance, i.e. the number of deals purchased, 
the discount rate and so on. Second, we collect online reviews for restaurants that offer these deals over a 
six-year period from Yelp.com, a popular online review site for restaurants. We augment this dataset with 
restaurants from the same geographical area that do not offer deals, to provide an apt control group.  
We model the arrival and valence of reviews over time to identify the effect of engaging in a deal on the 
rating of the merchant over time. Further, we consider the effect of moderators, such as restaurant 
segment, age and cuisine, on the relationship between the deal and ex post reviews. Finally, we consider 
the effect of deals offered by local competitors on the reviews for the focal restaurant, ex post. Our 
findings suggest that daily deals indeed affect consumer quality evaluations in online reviews, but the 
direction of this effect depends strongly on merchant characteristics, such as the price segment, location, 
and cuisine type. For most restaurants, we find that the average effect of a daily deal is negative, i.e. ex 
post review valence is significantly lower, indicating lower quality perceptions. Surprisingly, we find clear 
evidence of a spillover effect – the presence of competing deals in the neighborhood affects the valence of 
reviews even for those restaurants that do not offer deals.  
While our results indicate that deals tend to reduce online ratings, it is not clear whether this is because of 
ex post consumption, i.e. the consumer received poor service due to congestion or inadequate 
preparedness at the restaurant (Dholakia 2011b) when redeeming the deal, or if intrinsically, the offering 
of a deal reduced the perception of quality of the restaurant. In the latter case, reviewers may simply 
respond to the availability of a daily deal for a restaurant by lowering expectations, under the logic that 
deal-offering restaurants are likely to be “low quality” per se. To analyze this question, we extend our 
empirical models to a controlled setting through three lab experiments conducted on MTurk. 
                                                             
1 Indeed, in a recent small business survey by the National Restaurant Association, daily deals was the 
most popular marketing tool for Restaurants (Ipsos 2015). 
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Through this work, we contribute to the literature at the intersection of information systems and 
marketing by explicating, using archival as well as experimental data, the effects of offering daily deals on 
the quality perceptions of restaurants. Our work here is easily generalized to those contexts where services 
or complex products are offered, and where online reviews are viewed as reasonable sources of quality 
information. Moreover, we expand our understanding of how the competitive environment affects the 
quality perception of merchants, by considering the competitive effects of deals specifically. Broadly, we 
add to the large and influential literature on electronic word of mouth (eWOM) by analyzing the effects of 
deals on online reviews, thereby extending existing models of eWOM. 
Our work has also significant implications for practitioners.  First, we help inform merchant owners 
(restaurateurs in our study) who seek to understand the conditions under which online deals may be 
beneficial to the restaurant. We find that certain merchant characteristics, such as a newness of the 
merchant and the price of a merchant might strongly moderate the direction (positive or negative) of the 
effect on the reputation of offering a deal. More importantly, we observe strong evidence of a deal 
competitive effect; the presence of competing deals in the neighborhood affects eWOM even for those 
restaurants that do not offer deals. Moreover, merchants in highly competitive deal environments suffer 
significantly less (and may even benefit) from offering a deal. In the following section, we briefly outline 
the prior literature before discussing the methodology in detail. 
Background and Theory 
Online daily deals, also referred to as group-buying deals, social coupons or group discount vouchers (Luo 
et al. 2014, Kumar and Rajan 2012), are discount coupons posted online through a platform, such as 
Groupon or LivingSocial.  These sites operate double-sided platforms (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005) on 
which merchants offer deals (on one side of the platform) while individuals buy the deals (on the other 
side of the platform).  The platform appropriately extracts revenues from the merchant side of the 
platform, while subsidizing the consumer side.  Platform owners typically work with merchants to offer 
deals for a specific period of time (usually 2 weeks). Once purchased, the deal’s discounted price can be 
redeemed over a longer time-period (typically three months after the deal is posted) at the merchant, with 
some conditions applied on the bundling of coupons or on the specific form of services offered (Dholakia 
2010). Once the coupon expires, the consumer can still typically redeem the original dollar value of the 
coupon without the discount.  
Since the launch of online deals in 2008, they have experienced strong growth, with IBIS reporting that 
between 2009 and 2014, revenues have grown at an annual rate of 147.1%, reaching $3.4 billion in 2014 
(2015). Groupon and LivingSocial are market leaders, totally accounting for roughly 60% of the deals 
market. In recent years alone, the number of global active deals offered daily has grown from 180,000 in 
the first quarter of 2014 to 425,000 in the first quarter of 2015 (IBIS 2015). Because of the continued 
popularity of daily deals with merchants, practitioner news outlets have argued that daily deals are a new 
and integral part of the online and mobile marketing mix for merchants (Tuten and Ashley 2011, 
Integreon 2012, Krasnova et al. 2013, Bharadwaj et al. 2013).  However, and despite their popularity with 
customers as well, online deals have remained a contentious subject in practice (Agarwal 2013, Cohan 
2012).  
Within the academic literature, a small but growing body of work in marketing has focused on the extent 
to which deals affect firm performance. Specifically, scholars have provided insight into how offering a 
daily deal affects firm revenues (Dholakia 2010, Dholakia 2011a, Edelman et al. 2011, Dholakia and Kimes 
2011, Dholakia 2012, Reiner and Skiera 2013, Shivendu and Zhang 2013). In addition to revenue, 
Dholakia (2010, 2011a, 2011b) surveyed merchants to investigate the profitability of daily deals. The 
results, largely consistent with the practitioner press, indicate that only 50% of merchants offering deals 
actually made any surplus. One of the primary reasons for this is based on the observation that most 
consumers often do not spend more than the deal value (Dholakia 2011b). However, on the positive side, 
daily deals have been found to provide many of the immediate benefits of price promotions observed in 
the literature (Guadagni and Little 1983, Neslin, Henderson, and Quelch 1985, Blattberg and Neslin 1990) 
by increasing foot traffic, revenues, and visibility for merchants, at a lower customer acquisition cost 
(Dholakia 2011a, 2012c). Beyond revenues and margins, how do daily deals influence the focal merchants’ 
electronic word of mouth?  We address this specific question next. 
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Recent work has attempted to quantify the extent to which daily deals may influence a merchant’s brand 
attitudes and eWOM. In a survey of 931 U.S. consumers, Dholakia and Kimes (2011) examine consumer 
responses to daily deals and find there is no loss in brand equity for merchants offering deals. In fact, the 
authors comment: “To the contrary, respondents offered favorable comments about the restaurant and 
their dining experience” (p. 18). These authors also find that consumers are aware of the deals offered by 
multiple daily deal sites, with 50% or more of consumers reporting awareness of deals from Groupon, 
restaurant.com, LivingSocial, BuyWithMe, and TravelZoo.  Alternatively, Byers et al. (2012a, 2012b) focus 
on a single platform, Groupon, and report that offering a Groupon leads to an average 0.2 star rating 
decrease in Yelp2. Their study follows approximately 5,000 Groupons from many categories in the U.S, 
which were then linked to the online reviews for that merchant on Yelp. While Dholakia and Kimes 
(2011), by virtue of their design, do not account for the heterogeneity among merchants who offer deals, 
Byers et al. (2012a) include all retailers offering Groupon deals without accounting again for the 
heterogeneity of deal merchants. We argue that there is likely a middle ground here driven by 
heterogeneity of the merchants offering deals, and their competitive environments. Accounting for this 
heterogeneity will deliver, arguably, a more nuanced view of the effect of daily deals, suggesting that the 
negative or null effect from deals may not extend to all merchants. We consider the influence of these 
sources of heterogeneity below.  
As a first step, we note that daily deals represent a new online mixture of price promotions and opt-in 
advertisements (Edelman et al. 2011). Daily deal subscribers typically need to sign up with the platform 
(such as Groupon or LivingSocial) to access the deals and receive email messages with the equivalent of 
advertising copy for the merchants, which typically contain positively framed images and endorsements; 
these are akin to advertisements for the focal merchant (Shivendu and Zhang 2013). Additionally, daily 
deals represent price promotions, since they offer deep price discounts. We use these two aspects of daily 
deals to theoretically motivate the moderating effects of heterogeneity and competition in their effects on 
eWOM. 
Prior work has established that consumer expectations and attitudes are shaped by pricing strategies, 
more specifically, the promotional activities used by merchants (Mazumdar et al. 2005, Lynch and Ariely 
2000, Yoon et al. 2014, Lee and Tsai 2015). Research has established that higher prices are associated 
with higher quality evaluations and more positive eWOM, all else being equal (McGregor et al. 2007, Li 
and Hitt 2010). We are, however, interested in how the marginal effect of the daily deal on the resulting 
eWOM may change depending on the merchant’s characteristics, or more specifically, its price segment. 
Research studying the effects of price promotions on consumer attitudes and brand evaluations shows 
that the effect is driven largely by the discounted dollar amount (Blattberg et al. 1995). Winer (1986) first 
proposed that the larger the difference between the initial price and the purchase price, the greater the 
resulting consumer utility and the more positive the consumer attitude towards the merchant or product. 
He argued that this effect is predicated on the discounted dollar value rather than the discount rate per se; 
this effect has been empirically observed in various other product contexts as well (Della Bitta et al 1981, 
Grewal et al. 1998, Wu et al. 2004, Biswas et al. 2013).  
Following this logic in the daily deals context, we argue that deep discounts offered by merchants in the 
low-price segment are likely to be viewed more negatively, given that the resulting dollar value of the 
discount is small. Additionally, if lower prices are already associated with lower quality, further price 
discounts in this context are likely to be viewed even more negatively by consumers. Alternatively, deals 
offered by high-price segment merchants start from an expectation of high quality (Li and Hitt 2010) and 
also offer consumers greater discounts in absolute value. Thus, merchants in the high-price segment may 
not experience the same negative effect on their eWOM as merchants operating in a lower-price segment. 
In fact, strong associations made between price and qualities, which benefit high-price merchants, may 
even lead to a positive response on eWOM for such merchants. These arguments suggest that the 
marginal effects of daily deals on ex post eWOM are likely to be significantly negative for low-price 
merchants (consistent with Byers et al. (2012a)) but not so for merchants in the premium segment.  
To the extent that daily deals share features of opt-in advertisements, the persuasion knowledge model 
proposed by Friestad and Wright (1994) suggests that under certain conditions, the motivations behind 
                                                             
2
 The authors refer to this as the “Groupon effect” in their analysis (Byers et al. 2012a). 
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such promotional efforts are perceived as appropriate and reflect confidence in the product or service 
advertised. However, in other contexts, promotional or advertising efforts may smack of desperation and 
produce negative brand evaluations (Kirmani 1997, Chen and Kirmani 2015). Extending this argument to 
the daily deals context suggests that merchants providing daily deals under conditions that reflect 
confidence may not receive negative eWOM but may actually benefit from such daily deals. One such 
contingency in which it is viewed as legitimate to offer price promotions and invest in advertising effort is 
when the business is new (McDougall and Robinson 1990, Carter et al. 1994); anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that new businesses may find it advantageous to offer daily deals to recruit new customers 
(BizJournals 2013). In contrast, established merchants offering deals may lead to perceptions of weakness 
and desperation. Whether the merchant is truly in such a state may not matter; if offering a daily deal 
leads to some subset of consumers to draw such conclusions, brand perceptions are likely to suffer, 
leading to a higher probability of negative eWOM ex post. We thus expect that the age of the merchant to 
influence the extent to which daily deals affect eWOM, leading to a testable proposition.  
Beyond sources of merchant heterogeneity, merchants do not operate in a vacuum, but within a 
competitive landscape that typically includes other merchants and their competitive actions, which 
cumulatively determines the options available to consumers. This competitive environment, in turn, 
contributes to setting reference prices for the merchant segment (Mazumdar et al. 2005, Bell and Lattin 
2000). Moreover, it is well accepted that price changes affect the demand for other products, through 
cross-price elasticity (Sethuraman et al. 1999). Frequent price promotions on a segment within a 
geographical area can also lead to lower reference prices for that category, which affects price perceptions 
of all merchants in that category (Mayew and Winer 1992). Thus, if nearby competitors offer frequent 
daily deals, the reference price for similar products or services should shift downward along with 
consumer quality expectations, and the resulting eWOM, on average (Li and Hitt 2010).  However, it is 
likely that those merchants that offer deals, as a response of high deal competition, will not experience a 
negative deal effect as they are in fact matching prices with its competitors (Raghubir and Corfman 1995, 
1999).  The eWOM literature has also documented how the competitive environment affects eWOM 
(Forman et al. 2009, Li et al. 2011, Jabr and Zheng 2013, Kwark et al. 2014).  This reasoning brings into 
sharp focus the possibility that nearby deals might also negatively affect merchants who never offered 
deals, leading to a perverse and unexplored effect of daily deals within a competitive market. We thus test 
for the effect on a focal merchant’s eWOM when its competitors offer daily deals but it does not.  
Beyond these theoretical mechanisms, and from an operations management perspective, some firms are 
better equipped to react to the demand fluctuations created by online deals. Previous work in the price-
promotions and marketing literatures has shown that promotions can have a sudden and unpredictable 
effect on demand (Blattberg et al. 1995, Pauwels et al. 2002, Alvarez and Vázquez Casielles 2005). 
Moreover, it is well established that resource flexibility, and in particular workforce flexibility, are 
important firm attributes to handle demand changes (Paul and Jonathan 1991). For example, Ebben and 
Johnson (2005) show that flexible firms have very specific characteristics and that not all firms are able to 
achieve operational flexibility. Thus, it is plausible that certain merchants will be able to successfully 
accommodate the increased demand that results from online deals, while others will not. The practitioner 
press contains many such anecdotes, with a business owner recently stating: “We had thousands of orders 
pouring in that really we hadn't expected to have” (BBC 2011, 2012).  However, these effects should only 
be observable after the deal is redeemed and not necessarily before consumption. This highlights that 
there may be pre-consumption as well as post-consumption effects of daily deals on eWOM. While these 
differences are not directly observable using archival data, we address this question in more detail later in 
the paper.  
In summary, there is theoretical and anecdotal support for the notion that the effects of daily deals on 
eWOM are likely to be moderated by sources of merchant heterogeneity (price segment and merchant 
age) as well as competition. Given the multiple possible mechanisms for the effects of daily deals, rather 
than provide formal hypotheses, we allow the analysis to provide us with guidance. We next detail the 
data and methodology used to test for these effects.  
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Methodology 
Data 
We focus on online reviews and online deals for restaurants in a large U.S. metropolitan area, Washington 
D.C.  Prior work in online reviews (Mangold et al. 1999; Gu et al. 2012) suggests that restaurants provide a 
suitable context for studying eWOM, given the high-involvement nature of food. Existing research 
studying daily deals have also focused on services, particularly on restaurants, to understand their appeal 
within this sector (Farahat et al. 2012). Thus, the choice of restaurants as a context for studying the 
quality implications of daily deals is particularly suitable. The online reviews for the restaurants in our 
sample were collected from Yelp.com, which has over 14 million online reviews for restaurants, over 135 
million monthly visitors, and is the market leader in North American online reviews (Yelp 2015). For the 
purposes of this study, we collected data on 2,012 restaurants operating in Washington, D.C., roughly 
comparable to 2,035 operating restaurants reported by the National Restaurant Association’s estimate in 
D.C. for 2012, the focal year of our data collection.  Each Yelp restaurant listing contains general 
information on restaurant characteristics, such as location, cuisine, price point and ambience, and online 
review information, such as the average rating and number of reviews. Furthermore, for each restaurant 
we collected each individual review, which resulted in 143,745 reviews collected between 2004 (Yelp’s 
initial release) and 2012. Each review has a numerical rating, text comments, and timestamp. 
We match this data with the data for Washington, D.C. provided by Yipit.com, a service provider 
aggregating deal data across multiple online daily deal platforms, for a 13-month period between 
December 2011 and December 2012.  We chose Yipit.com because it aggregates transaction data from 
over 97% of daily deal sites (Yipit.com 2015). Unlike prior research focused on measuring the effect a 
single daily deals vendor (Byers et al. 2012a), we observe deal offers from 31 vendors, such as Groupon, 
LivingSocial, GoogleOffers, Yelp Deals, and so on. In total we observe 2,425 deals corresponding to 935 
restaurants in Washington D.C.  Each deal listing contains information about the merchant, such as 
phone number, name and geographical location; deal characteristics, such as price, discount and 
duration; and deal performance metrics, such as quantity sold and revenues generated from the deal. 
Unfortunately, this dataset does not provide data on how many purchased deals were redeemed at the 
merchants over time. 
These two data sources—Yelp and Yipit—form the core of our empirical data collection strategy.  To 
aggregate these into a single and dynamic panel data set, we first summarize the review and deal data for 
each restaurant into two-week periods. We choose a two-week period because the majority of deals sell for 
two weeks (Mean=2.01 weeks). Thus, our unit of analysis is the restaurant-period. As our primary interest 
is modeling the deal-review relationship, we discard any periods beginning before the start date of our 
daily deals data set.  Thus, our panel contains aggregated information for 28 two-week time periods 
covering 13 months (from December 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012).  Moreover, since the release of the 
deal for a particular merchant in the two-week period may not be the same, we create a dynamic panel 
where each merchant with a deal has a two-week period after the deal.  Of the initial 2,012 restaurants in 
the reviews dataset, we find 1,390 unique restaurants with reviews in this time period matching to 922 
merchants offering online deals (of the 935 merchants with deals collected for the time period).  After 
aggregating and collating the dataset into two-week periods, we have 19,691 restaurant-period 
observations in the panel. 
Our dependent variable of interest, , is the average numerical rating of the reviews for restaurant 
 arriving in time period .  Our primary independent variables of interest are 	
  (equal to 1 if 
restaurant   is engaging in one or more online deals during time period   and 0 otherwise) and 
	
  (the number of competitors of restaurant   offering a deal during time period  ).  A 
competitor is defined as a restaurant that has the same cuisine type and price-point in the same 
geographical area, defined by zip code.  A deal is considered offered during time period  if that period 
overlaps with the deal sales period.  Additionally, we control for all the observable characteristics of the 
restaurant and the deal offered, such as location, price point, cuisine, and all other characteristics listed in 
Yelp, such as ambience and noise level.  A full description of the variables used in our models can be 
found in Table 1.  Summary statistics and a correlation table for the resulting panel data set can be seen in 
Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. We now describe our econometric model. 
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Empirical Model 
We model the effect of deals offered by a merchant and its nearby competitors on the ratings of that 
merchant over time. We control for baseline Yelp metrics (average rating and number of reviews at the 
deal period start date) and the competitive landscape (the number of restaurants in the same geographical 
area) and propose a hierarchical model.  First, to capture heterogeneity of longitudinal dynamics across 
restaurants, we allow the effect of each of the predictors to vary by restaurant. As such, the first-level 
model in the hierarchy is: 
 
where  indexes restaurants and  indexes time periods. Furthermore, we argue that deal and competition 
effects might systematically vary based on restaurant characteristics. Hence, the second level in our 
hierarchy regresses each predictor’s coefficient in the first level on all the observable characteristics of the 
restaurant captured in Yelp.  Thus the second-level model is: 
 =  +	
 + 
 +   + ∑ "
($)
&'

($)(
$) + ∑ *
(+)
&ℎ
(+)-
+) , (2) 
where / ∈ 11,… ,55	 indexes the predictors in the first level (i.e. 	
 , 6
7'8
9
: , 
6
, 
, 	
); ; indexes cuisine types and &'

($)
 are dummy variables 
equal to 1 if restaurant  has cuisine type ;; and  indexes other restaurant characteristics (e.g. ambience, 
noise level, parking options, etc.).  
We model this specification using a Hierarchical Bayes model (Gelman et al. 2014, Rossi and Allenby 
2003) that allows us to account for the observable and unobservable heterogeneity of the merchants.  
Hierarchical Bayes (HB) models have been highly popular in marketing research as a useful tool to model 
multi-faceted, non-linear phenomena (Rossi et al. 2012). Bayesian methods are particularly appropriate 
to the decisions modeled in marketing problems where there are many units of analysis (e.g. customers or 
sites), each with multiple observations, and there is a desire to account for individual differences (Rossi 
and Allenby 2003).  HB models consist of two main steps: first, a model is written in a hierarchical form, 
such as the model specified above. Second, the model is estimated using Bayesian methods, such as 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) (Rossi et al. 2012). 
Previous work both in marketing and IS have used Bayesian methods to study the dynamics and effects of 
online reviews (e.g. Zhao et al. 2013; Trusov et al. 2010; Moe and Trusov 2011).  For example, both 
Dellarocas et al. (2007) and Dickinger and Mazanec (2008) analyze how online reviews affect firm 
performance using hierarchical models.  Similarly, Zhou and Duan (2010) model the impact of user 
reviews and professional reviews, in the context of software downloads, using a Bayesian framework. 
Thus, there is a significant body of work in the extant literature supporting the use of Bayesian methods to 
model the effects of online reviews. We base our Bayesian analyses on these accepted methods. 
Model Estimation and Results  
We estimate the specified model using a Bayesian MCMC sampling methodology. All priors are standard 
conjugate diffuse priors.  Starting values were taken from the maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
from independent linear models estimated on the same dataset.  The MCMC chain was run for 10,000, 
after an initial burn-in period of 1,200 iterations [converges fast].  The posterior distributions of the 
coefficients of 5,000 draws were extracted and analyzed. 
Table 4 summarizes the posterior distributions of the model coefficients for the longitudinal model of 
review rating over time for each restaurant.  Below, we report the posterior mean for each coefficient of 
interest, followed by the 95% high probability density (HPD) interval.  In agreement with previous work 
(Byers et al. 2012a), we find a negative effect of offering an online deal.  In particular, we find that offering 
a daily deal results in a decrease in mean rating during the same period of 0.902 [0.672, 1.436].  However, 
we also find two strong moderators to this effect: price point and restaurant age.  We find that 
restaurants with a one-level higher price point experience a reduction of the “deal effect” by 0.539 [0.211, 
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0.567].  We also find that younger restaurants are less negatively affected by deals, with a 1-standard 
deviation reduction in age implying a reduction in the deal effect of 0.665 [0.333, 0.748].  Thus, premium 
restaurants, as well as new ventures, experience less negative fallout from the offering of a deal. However, 
how does the presence of daily deals within the competition affect the restaurant? The results show a 
significant negative effect of deal competition on the average review rating for all restaurants.  For every 
proximal competitor offering a deal, we find a decrease in mean rating during the same period of 0.235 
[0.152, 0.368]. The surprising effect here is that this result extends even to those restaurants that do not 
offer deals; the presence of deals in their neighborhood negatively affects their review ratings as well.  We 
do not observe any significant moderation of this “deal competition effect” by characteristics of the focal 
restaurant – this effect is entirely based on the presence of deals in proximal competition, defined as 
within price point, cuisine and geographical area. This effect is new in the literature and has not been 
examined before. 
Discussion 
Our empirical analysis of the restaurant reviews and online deals demonstrates that offering a deal has an 
overall negative effect on the reviews arriving within the 2-week period during which the deal was offered. 
However, we observe certain moderators of this effect, namely the price point and age of the restaurant, 
suggesting systematically weaker negative effects for premium and new restaurants.  Most notably, we 
also find evidence for a deal competition effect. That is, all merchants (even those who never offer online 
deals) are negatively affected by nearby competing merchants offering deals.   
These conclusions are based on a large data set and an unconstrained modeling framework that allows 
coefficient estimates to vary by merchant and controls for a range of factors that may affect the rating of 
the restaurant.  However, there is still a possibility that our findings are driven by unobserved variables, 
selection issues, and/or endogeneity between the decision to offer a deal and the quality of a restaurant.  
That is, merchants exhibiting poor performance that is not reflected in their previous online reviews and 
therefore, unobservable to us, may seek to influence their short-term online ratings by offering an online 
deal.  However, we note that any such effort may see a delayed effect, since online deals in large cities 
typically go live several months after the terms of the deal are finalized (Groupon 2015b, LivingSocial 
2015, GrouponWorks 2014, Zabranova 2012). In other words, the gap in time between the restaurant 
opting for a deal and the eventual offering of the deal is often separated by several months, which is 
significantly longer than the 2-week (4-week in robustness tests) period we model. Therefore, the effects 
of reverse causality, in terms of lower ratings driving the decision to offer a daily deal, are muted here 
given the design of the analysis.   
One limitation of the negative “deal effect” identified by our empirical model is that we are unable to 
distinguish between a reduction in ratings due to a decrease in performance of the merchant during the 
deal period and a decrease in quality expectations by the customer prior to consumption.  That is, a 
negative effect on the restaurant’s rating could be because the consumer redeemed the coupon in this 
period and experienced reduced service quality. Alternatively, the negative response could be due to the 
impression formed in potential consumers that the focal restaurant offering a deal is “in distress” as 
suggested by Friestad and Wright (1994), thereby leading to lower reviews even amongst regular 
customers or those without coupons. Even in the case of the “deal competition” effect, we cannot 
differentiate between the case where the reduction in review ratings emerges from deal consumption in 
the presence of multiple available proximal deals, or whether the overall expectations of the consumer for 
service quality in a geographical area where daily deals are common is lower, thereby leading to lower 
expectations and ratings in general. These effects cannot be teased out using our secondary data. To 
address these issues, we augment our econometric analyses with three lab experiments, specifically to 
tease out these confounding effects and provide cleaner identification. In the first two studies, we test for 
the possible effect of offering an online deal on consumer quality expectations without any possibility of 
actual deal redemption, and evaluate the moderating influence of prices (Lab Study 1) and restaurant age 
(Lab Study 2).  We follow these up with Lab Study 3, where we test for the competitor deals effect. We 
describe these experiments in detail next. 
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Experimental Testing 
Lab Study 1: Deals and the Price Points of Restaurants 
Procedure, Data and Measures 
Lab Study 1 tests whether consumers’ online evaluations of a merchant’s services are affected if the 
merchant offers an online deal and whether the price point of the merchant moderates this effect. Recall 
that evidence of this effect was observed in the Bayesian analyses reported earlier. For the purposes of the 
experiment, four hundred respondents (191 women) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were 
recruited for pay in this study.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four 2 (deal offered: yes vs. 
no) x 2 (price point: high vs. low) between subjects conditions.  
The stimuli were developed by selecting a restaurant from our Yelp data set with the most popular cuisine, 
an average number of reviews, and an average numerical ratings and using the information displayed in 
Yelp.com. To avoid providing any biasing cues, we withheld any review text in the description of the 
restaurant.  To create the deal condition (treatment), we showed that the restaurant is offering a Yelp 
online deal (one of the daily deal vendors in our deals dataset) using the same user interface shown by 
Yelp.  Further, to create the high and low price conditions, we changed the price point of the restaurant 
from one ($) to four ($$$$).  In all four conditions, the restaurant was renamed to “Italian Kitchen” and 
given a new address to control for possible familiarity with the actual restaurant.  We were also careful to 
maintain the user interface of Yelp.com by using the exact same fonts and colors.  Participants were first 
asked to read the information in the webpage for the restaurant and then assess the quality of the 
restaurant, followed by a manipulation check on the price of restaurant to ensure that the price treatment 
had worked. 
We measured brand evaluation, which is a composite of purchase intention and perceived quality.  
Purchase intention and perceived quality load to the same factor, with r=0.87.  We adapted purchase 
intention from Jamieson and Bass (1989): “If you were thinking about going to an Italian restaurant, how 
likely would you be to visit this restaurant?” (1 = “very unlikely” to 7 = “very likely”).  We adapted 
perceived quality from Kirmani and Wright (1989): “Given the information provided about this 
restaurant, please rate the likely overall quality of this restaurant” (1 = ”very low" to 7 = “very high”). 
Finally, and as a manipulation check, we ask respondents to rate the restaurant in regards to pricing (1 = 
“low-priced to 7 = “high-priced”). 
Results and Discussion 
We first ensure that the results from the Bayesian model were replicated in the lab. We find a significant 
deal x price point interaction effect (F(1, 400) = 6.31, p <0.01; see Figure 1). A first set of planned contrast 
show that for non-deal restaurants, a higher price point had no significant direct effect on perceived 
quality (Mno deals-low = 5.14 vs. Mno deals-high = 5.28; F (1, 400) = 2.12, p=0.33). For deal restaurants, however, 
having a higher price point significantly increased quality perceptions (Mdeal-low = 3.94 vs. Mdeal-high = 5.6; F 
(1,400) = 3.59, p <0.05). A different set of planned contrasts show that for restaurants associated with a 
lower price point, there is a significant decease in perceived quality when a deal is offered (Mlow-non deal = 
5.14 vs. Mlow-deal = 3.94; F (1,400) = 4.11, p<0.05). However, this effect becomes "marginally significant" 
and positive for restaurants with a high price point restaurants (Mhigh-non deal = 5.28 vs. Mhigh-deal = 5.6; F 
(1,400) = 3.71, p=0.07).  The manipulation check on the pricing of restaurants was also successful. Those 
in the deal condition indicated that the restaurant was lower priced, showing that the treatment was 
effective. 
As in our empirical model, we observe that the price point of the restaurant moderates the negative effect 
of the deal in a controlled experimental setting with no consumption possibility. These results suggest 
that even before visiting the restaurant and experiencing the service provided, there is a decrease in 
perceived quality and purchase intentions for certain merchants who offer online deals. More specifically, 
this finding adds further evidence that certain merchants are likely to be perceived as “desperate” (in our 
case the low-priced merchants, representing the non-premium segment) whereas other merchants will be 
perceived as “confident” (in our case the high-priced or premium merchants), as first suggested by 
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Kirmani (1990). Beyond the segment of the restaurant, is it possible that daily deals offered by new 
restaurants are viewed less negatively? We explore this contrast in the next experiment. 
Lab Study 2: Daily Deals and Restaurant Age 
Procedure, Data, and Measures 
Lab study 2 tests whether consumers’ brand evaluations are affected by the offering of a daily deal and 
whether the newness (age) of the restaurant moderates this effect. 398 respondents (175 women) from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated for pay in this study.  Respondents were randomly 
assigned to one of four 2 (deal offered: yes vs. no) x 2 (new restaurant: yes vs. no) between subjects 
conditions.  Stimuli were identical to study 1, except that for the new condition, we added a banner 
showing that the restaurant opened recently using existing Yelp’s user interface, displayed prominently as 
it is in Yelp’s content webpage.  As in the previous study, participants first read the information in the 
webpage for the restaurant and then assess the quality of the restaurant followed by a manipulation check 
on the price of restaurant.  The measures are the same as in the first study: brand evaluation, which is a 
composite of purchase intention and perceived quality.  Purchase intention and perceived quality load to 
the same factor with r=0.88 with these subjects as well. 
Results and Discussion 
Replicating our results from our empirical model, we find a significant deal x new interaction (F(1, 398) = 
6.44, p <0.02; see Figure 2). A first set of planned contrast show that for non-deal restaurants, being new 
had no significant effect on brand evaluation (Mno deal-established = 5.84 vs. Mno deal-new = 5.17; F (1, 398) = 1.15, 
p=0.28). For deal restaurants, however, being new significantly increased brand evaluations (Mdeal-established 
= 4.03 vs. M-deal-new = 6.13; F (1,398) = 4.59, p <0.05). A different set of planned contrasts show that for 
already established restaurants, there is a significant decrease in behavioral intentions when a deal is 
offered (Mestablished-no deal l = 5.84 vs. Mestablished-deal = 4.02; F (1,398) = 5.32, p<0.05). However, this effect 
becomes "marginally significant" and positive for newly established restaurants (Mnew-no-deal = 5.16 vs. 
Mnew-deal = 6.13; F (1,398) = 3.40, p=0.06). Again, the manipulation of the pricing of the restaurant was 
successful. Those in the deal condition indicated that the restaurant was lower priced. 
Replicating the results of our empirical model, we observe that the newness of the restaurant does indeed 
moderate the negative effect of the deal in a controlled experimental setting. These results also add 
credence to the notion that brand evaluations (perceived quality and purchase intentions) decrease even 
before consumption only by offering an online deal. New restaurants are expected to offer daily deals as a 
way to incentivize new consumers to take a chance on the merchant (Dholakia 2012); thus, offering a deal 
does not reduce the perceptions of quality in such cases. We test for the effect of competition next. 
Lab Study 3: Daily Deals and Deal Competition 
Procedure, Data, and Measures 
Lab study 3 tests whether consumers’ brand evaluations are affected if the focal merchant offers an online 
deal and if nearby competitors also offer online deals. 404 respondents (187 women) from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated for pay in this study.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one 
of four 2 (deal offered: yes vs. no) x 2 (deal competition: high vs. none) between subjects conditions.  
Stimuli were identical to study 1, except that for the deal competition condition, we added a measure of 
the degree of deal competition for similar restaurants nearby. More specifically, a restaurant with high 
nearby competition a graphic that showed, consistent with Yelp’s user interface, : “There are 20 deals for 
similar restaurants in this area.”  As in the previous study, participants first read information about the 
restaurant and then assess the quality of the restaurant followed by a manipulation check on the price of 
restaurant.  The measures are the same as in study 1;  brand evaluation, which is a composite of purchase 
intention and perceived quality.  Purchase intention and perceived quality load to the same factor, r=0.91. 
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Results and Discussion 
Expanding the results of our empirical model, we find a significant deal x deal competition interaction (F 
(1, 404) = 6.74, p <0.01; see Figure 3). A first set of planned contrast show that for non-deal restaurants, 
having a high deal competition had a significant negative effect on brand evaluation (Mno deal-no deal competition  
= 5.78 Vs. Mno deal-deal competition = 4.19; F(1, 404) = 5.92, p<0.02). For deal offering restaurants, however, 
high deal competition marginally increased brand evaluations (Mdeal-no deal competition  = 3.78 vs. Mdeal-deal 
competition = 4.33; F (1,404) = 4.59, p <0.07). A different set of planned contrasts show that for restaurants 
with no nearby deal competition, there is a significant decease in behavioral intentions when a deal is 
offered (Mno deal competition-no deal = 5.78 vs. Mno deal competition-deal = 3.78; F (1,404) = 4.92, p<0.05). However, 
this effect is not significant for restaurants with high nearby deal competition (Mdeal competition-no deal = 4.19 
vs. Mdeal competition-deal = 4.33; F (1,404) = 1.46, p=0.22). The manipulation of the restaurant price was also 
successful, and those in the deal condition indicated that the restaurant was lower priced. 
As previously found in our empirical model, we observe evidence of a deal competition effect. That is, 
even merchants who do not offer deals are affected by nearby competitors offering online deals.  In this 
study, however, we go beyond this finding and show that for merchants without nearby deal competition, 
offering a deal would lead to a significant decrease in brand evaluations. However, for merchants with 
high deal competition, we do not find evidence of any change in brand evaluations as a result of offering a 
deal. The results show that in environments with high daily deal intensity, the negative effects associated 
with a deal are muted, and that offering a deal here is viewed as standard practice. We discuss these 
results in more detail in the next section. 
General Discussion and Implications 
The revenues from online deals are expected to climb to $5.5 billion in 2016 according to industry 
analysts (BIA Kelsey 2014). However, these figures notwithstanding, the offering of daily deals in services 
raises several questions about their effects on merchants, consumer responses and platforms in the 
literature. Our study aims to shed light on how online deals and the competitive deal landscape are 
affecting consumer perceptions in specific within the restaurant sector, where daily deals are popular and 
their effects may be gauged in good measure through online reviews on Yelp.  In this work, we show that 
under certain conditions, offering online deals can indeed negatively affect consumer perceptions, 
captured as review rating on ex post Yelp reviews for the focal restaurant.  More importantly, this effect, 
however, might be positive or negative depending on the merchant’s characteristics.  
In a longitudinal analysis of restaurants reviews from Yelp.com and a data set covering online deals 
offered by the same restaurants, we find evidence that restaurants’ short-term ex post ratings are 
negatively affected by offering a deal. However, we find that certain restaurant characteristics, such as the 
price point and the newness, i.e. age, of the restaurant, are strong moderators of this deal effect. In the 
case of premium restaurants operating in the higher priced segment, we see that the response of 
consumers ex post appears to be less negative, suggesting that these restaurants are viewed as offering 
deals from a position of confidence. Alternatively, lower-rated restaurants and those in the lower price 
ranges are viewed as being “distressed” and receive negative quality feedback to daily deals.  We add 
credence to the notion that customers perceive the online deal efforts of restaurants as desperate or 
confident depending on their particular circumstances. We also see an intriguing spillover effect from 
daily deals to proximal restaurants that do not offer any deals but see their quality perceptions reduce. 
That is, by including in our analysis the deals offered by nearby competitors, we also observe a decrease in 
their short-term review ratings when competitors offer deals.   
We proceed to replicate these findings in a controlled setting.  In Lab Study 1 and 2, we find support for 
our empirical findings that there is a general decrease in the purchase intentions and perceived quality of 
restaurants that offer deals, and find that this effect is strongly moderated by the price of the restaurant 
and restaurant newness. This is consistent with Kirmani and Wright’s (1989) assertion that  “many people 
spontaneously assume high advertising expense implies managerial confidence and high quality unless 
[…] desperation undermine is salient to them.”  Further, we are able to rule out that the decrease in rating 
observed in our empirical models is solely attributable to poor performance of the restaurant, as some 
customers have claimed in their dealings with the restaurant during the redemption period. Indeed, we 
find that even before there is any product or service consumption (as is the case with our lab subjects), 
 Daily Deals Competition and eWOM 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016  13
there is a decrease in brand evaluations simply by offering an online deal.  These results actually have very 
important implications for restaurants that offer daily deals as well as platforms that offer them. 
Furthermore, in Lab Study 3, we replicate our empirical model’s finding that nearby competitors offering 
online deals are also affecting the rating of merchants. 
Taken together, our results present a more complete view of how the recent and highly popular 
phenomenon of online deals is affecting consumer quality perceptions, leading to several theoretical 
contributions to the literature.  First, building on early work on daily deals by Dholakia (2012) and Byers 
et al. (2012a) suggesting that online deals affect firm performance and online reviews, we provide specific 
conditions under which online deals affect online reviews and consumer perceptions.  The nuances in how 
deals affect consumer perceptions are important in being able to assess the true value of such programs. 
Second, our work extends the work of Wright (1986) and Kirmani and Wright (1989) in understanding 
how consumers interpret a marketer’s efforts, motives, and tactics.  We show that in the current 
information-rich environment from online sources, consumers do form quality attributions based on the 
cues found in online reviews, online deals, and the particular conditions characterizing each merchant. In 
fact, since consumers are keenly aware of the deep discounts found in online deals, they may be using the 
information about the marketing campaigns of the merchant over time as indicators of the risks taken by 
the merchant (i.e. customer acquisition cost).  Moreover, our results suggest that consumers do not 
interpret marketing efforts in a vacuum. In fact, by examining the promotional actions of nearby 
competitors, our work suggests that the consumer’s “schema” in evaluating merchants proposed by 
Wright (1986) is more complex than previously thought of. To our knowledge, we are the first to outline 
the conditions under which market-specific quality determinants, such as the presence of proximal daily 
deals within the competition, affect an individual’s quality attributions. One possible explanation for the 
deal competitions effect is that a higher number of nearby competitors offering deals leads to a reduction 
in reference prices for the restaurant’s services.  That is, a drastic reduction in the price of some services 
might affect quality attributions for all other merchant in that market.  This is important since it suggests 
that online review for firms or merchants are likely to be affected by the actions of others, a form of cross-
market elasticity that has not been addressed in detail as yet. Finally, we also contribute to the price 
promotions literature by suggesting that there are actually two layers in the effect promotions have on 
brand evaluations –a pre-consumption effect and a post-consumption effect.  Our empirical testing 
through MTurk shows, for the first time, that such pre-consumption effects are not only possible but also 
actually salient and likely reflect a combined influence of media, anecdotal evidence and offline word of 
mouth.  
Apart from these contributions, there are significant implications from our work for practice, especially 
for merchants and platform owners. While there has been significant recent media attention to the 
failures of daily deals merchants, we find conditions under which daily deals can be beneficial in terms of 
online reputation to merchants, which is a key question for both merchants and platform owners. For 
platform owners, such as Google and LivingSocial our work also raises many pertinent issues. First, since 
consumers appear to be interpreting online deals either as a signal of high confidence or desperation, the 
daily deals platform might want to highlight the cues signaling high confidence, through the selection of 
the merchant or the structuring of the promotion itself. Additionally, we believe that deal platforms could 
actually benefit from using and reporting the information available on the merchant in online reviews 
platforms, such as Yelp.com and Foursquare.com. For example, if some reviewers mention the words 
“deals, Groupon, or Living Social” in the text and seem to be pleased with the service and deal provided by 
the merchant, then the customers making quality inferences could take this information into account. 
Another interesting perspective raised by our work is the possibility of offering deals only for consumers 
on-demand. That is, offering deals to consumers around a particular area and the possibility of buying 
deals only when consumers are actually at the merchant’s place. Using the geographical location from 
mobile devices, for example, might allow daily deal vendors to showcase offers at the right time (i.e. just 
before consumption). These represent fruitful avenues for further research. 
Our study also has some important limitations. In regards to our empirical model, we are limited in our 
ability to generalize our findings since our data is for a single major city in the United States. However, we 
observe the population of online deals for over a year, which allows us to account for seasonality effects 
during the year. Further, while we are able identify a deal competition effect in our empirical model and 
confirm this effect in a controlled setting, we cannot rule out or specifically test individual mechanisms 
that might drive a decrease in ratings for focal merchants under high deal competition. Future work 
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should address the specific mechanisms behind the deal competition effect to understand consumer 
choice given a range of different competitive environments.  This would be a more accurate representation 
of the current state of daily deal vendors and restaurants in many cities in the U.S. 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description 
  Average rating of reviews arriving during time period t for restaurant i 
	
  Binary variable indicating whether a deal was initialized by restaurant  during time 
period .  Also used in lagged form. 
6
7'8
9
:   Number of reviews in Yelp for restaurant  prior to Dec. 1, 2011 
6
>  Rating in Yelp for restaurant i prior to Dec. 1, 2011 

  Number of restaurants listed in Yelp in the same zip code as restaurant  
	
   Number of deals being offered during time period  in the same zip code as 
restaurant  

  Price point of restaurant i equal to the number of Yelp dollar signs (1-4) 

 The number of days from the first review for restaurant  prior to Dec. 1, 2011  
&'
 Binary variable indicating whether a cuisine (16 cuisines in total) is listed in the 
cuisine type for restaurant  
?ℎ
&ℎ  Categorical variables describing other restaurant characteristics, such as: payment 
methods, parking, attire, group-friendly, kids-friendly, waiter, Wi-Fi, alcohol, etc. 
(15 in total) 
  The zip code of the restaurant (12 in total) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean (SD) Range 
Ratingit 3.43 (1.07) 1,5 
Dealit 0.03 (0.16) 0,1 
Pricei 1.89 (0.72) 1,4 
Agei 560.14 11, 2920.85 
BaseNumReviewsi 165.40 (129.24) 0, 1963 
BaseRatingi 3.47 (0.53) 1,5 
Cuisinei NA NA 
OtherCharsi NA NA 
Locationi NA NA 
RestInZipi 206.31 (88.27) 86, 330 
DealsInZipit 2.43 (2.13) 0, 12 
 
Table 3. Correlation Table 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Rating 1 
  
 
    
Deal -0.03 1 
 
 
    
Price 0.02 0.03 1  
    
Age 0.13 0.05 0.01 1     
BaseNumReviews 0.1 0.02 0.15 0.22 1 
   
BaseRating 0.35 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.19 1 
  
RestInZip 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 1 
 
DealsInZip -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.14 1 
 
Table 4. Multi-level Hierarchical Bayesian Results 
  Mean (SD) HPD (Lower) HPD (Upper) 
First Level       
Intercept 0.845 (0.73) 0.785 0.922 
Deal -0.902 (0.07) -1.436 -0.672 
Deal (lag 1) -0.461 (0.15) -0.911 -0.193 
Deal (lag 2) -0.098 (0.51) -0.476 0.223 
BaseNumReviews 0.000 (0.00) -0.001 0.001 
BaseRating 0.855 (0.02) 0.798 0.986 
RestInZip 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 0.000 
DealsInZip -0.235 (0.04) -0.368 -0.152 
Second Level: 	
 
   
Intercept 0.055 (0.08) 0.017 0.222 
Pricepoint 0.539 (0.00) 0.211 0.567 
Age -0.665 (0.00) -0.748 -0.333 
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Second Level: 	
    
Intercept 0.111 (0.04) 0.051 0.287 
Pricepoint 0.001 (0.41) -0.112 0.241 
Age -0.034 (0.55) -0.211 0.099 
OtherChars (15 in total) Included 
Cuisines (16 in total) Included 
Location (12 in total) Included 
Sample size (unique restaurants) N=19,691 (1,390) 
BIC 4783.4 
 
Figure 1. Brand Evaluation as a Function of Deal Offered and the Price of Merchants 
 
Figure 2. Brand Evaluations as a Function of Deals Offered and the Newness of Merchants 
 
Figure 3. Brand Evaluation as a Function of Deal Offered and Deal Competition 
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